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to assume that the growing crops were those of the landowner.
Further, the lease exonerated defendant from such damages, and,
finally, defendant had paid the landowner $125.00 and secured a
release from damages to the surface. The court noted that plain-
tiff had abandoned all claims against the landowner for breach
of the lessor's warranty of peaceful possession, and, therefore,
it did not determine whether plaintiff would have been entitled
to recover from his lessor.
INSURANCE
J. Denson Smith*
Much of the litigation before the courts during the last term
involved, as usual, claims against insurers.
The following comments deal with some of the cases which
presented significant issues of law relating to the insurance con-
tract.
In Graves v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.' the First Circuit Court
of Appeal followed the view of the Third expressed in two
earlier cases2 and held mutually repugnant an escape clause in a
garage liability policy and an excess clause in an automobile
policy held by an individual. The vehicle involved in the accident
was owned by an automobile sales agency but was being operated
by a person to whom the agency had lent it for use while his own
vehicle was being repaired. The policy carried by the sales
agency, the garage liability policy, covered the car. In addition,
the driver was covered under the provisions of a policy carried
by him on the vehicle being repaired. The protection afforded
by the garage policy applied "if no other valid and collectible
insurance either primary or excess" was available. The protec-
tion provided for the driver under his own policy while oper-
ating a vehicle not owned by him was declared to be "excess
insurance over any other valid and collectible insurance." The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and "found no reason to
depart from the solution" arrived at by the lower courts and
followed their view that the excess and escape clauses in the
two policies were "mutually repugnant and ineffective." Per-
haps much could be said in favor of the consistency which is
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 200 So.2d 67 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
2. Lincombe v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 166 So.2d 920 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1964), and State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 184 So.2d
750 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
reflected in the mentioned holdings. Pretermitting, however,
consideration of this aspect of the matter, it is believed, for
whatever it may be worth, that the result is not in keeping with
what the underwriters were trying to accomplish.
3
Primarily, it seems worthwhile to observe that most insurers
do not prepare the policies they use. They are prepared instead,
presently at least, 4 by the American Insurance Association, and
are subject to approval by the Louisiana Casualty and Surety
Division. It is not, therefore, permissible to believe that the pro-
visions in question reflect an effort by one insurer to shift re-
sponsibility to another. 5 Presumably, instead, they are designed
to distribute coverage equitably between the insurers when
more than one is involved. According to the industry, the pre-
mium dollar is allocated primarily to the coverage on the car
and secondarily to the driver. 6 Pursuant thereto, the insurance
on the car is counted as primary and that on the driver is sec-
ondary. To effectuate this purpose, the family automobile policy
contains only a pro rata clause with respect to other insurance
binding the insurer to pay its proportionate part of a loss where
there is other valid and collectible insurance, but qualifies this
by providing that if the insured is driving a car that he does not
own, the coverage afforded is only excess. Having, by way of
illustration, two cars, each covered by such a policy, with the
owner of one car driving the other, the excess clause in the policy
covering the car being driven would not be applicable and the
coverage would be primary, whereas the excess clause in the pol-
icy covering the driver would apply. Although the policy cover-
ing the driver would provide other valid and collectible insur-
ance, nevertheless, on the facts of the case such other insurance
would by its terms be excess only. The principle that the policy
on the car is primary and that on the driver is excess is not
adhered to, however, in garage liability policies. The reasons sup-
porting this deviation from the basic principle are accurately
reflected in the opinion of the Supreme Court. The purpose, it
seems, is to make possible a reduction in the premium paid by
the garage.7 This purpose is effectuated by means of the provi-
sion in the garage policy which makes its omnibus coverage ap-
3. This discussion concerns "other insurance" clauses in use in Louisiana in
the kind of policies being considered.
4. Formerly prepared by the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters.
5. But see Comment, Automobile Liability Insurance-Effect of Double Cov-
erage and "Other Insurance" Clauses, 38 MINN. L. REV. 838 (1954).
6. Hawkes, Liability Guiding Principles, 451 INs. L.J. (Aug. 1960) ; 7 CAS.
& SuR. Rnv. 3 (1963) ; 9 CAS & SuR. R v. 6 (1965).
7. See LOUISIANA AUTOMOBILE CASUALTY MANUAL, Rule 521.
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plicable only if there is no other valid and collectible insurance
whether primary or excess. The primary insurance is, there-
fore, shifted from the car, when owned or used by a garage, to
the insurer of the individual. Hence, if the driver, while oper-
ating the car owned by the garage, is protected by his own policy
notwithstanding that the coverage afforded thereby is excess,
then the garage policy by its terms will not generally apply.
From the standpoint of the driver's policy, there is on the facts
no other valid and collectible insurance inasmuch as the clause
in it by which excess liability is assumed precludes applicability
of the garage policy. It becomes, therefore, the primary insurer.
By the same token, if the car being driven is not owned by the
garage but is being used in its business, as, for example, in the
case of a car in the hands of a dealer for sale, then if there is a
policy covering the car it will afford primary coverage, the pol-
icy covering the driver excess coverage, and the garage policy
will not generally apply. The garage liability policy will apply,
however, if the car being used by the garage is owned by another
and is not covered by liability insurance and if the driver oper-
ating it when the accident occurs is also not covered by a policy
of his own. This policy provides another qualification: whatever
its limits of liability may be, they are reduced by its terms when
the car is being operated by, say, a borrower, or someone trying
it out, to the minimum requirements of an applicable finan-
cial responsibility law, and if a primary or excess insurer must
pay but the coverage is less than the prescribed minimums, the
garage insurer is liable for the difference. Of course, it is true
that the policies covering the car, the driver, and the garage pro-
vide valid and collectible insurance under some circumstances
but it seems not necessary to conclude from this fact that the
clauses in question are mutually repugnant. The Louisiana Civil
Code recognizes that when a clause is susceptible of two interpre-
tations it must be understood in that in which it may have some
effect rather than in a sense which would render it nugatory 8
and a clause which presents two meanings must be taken in the
sense most congruous to the matter of the contract. 9 Garage
liability policies can be sold at a lower rate only because the
coverage afforded when the car is being driven by third persons
is made subordinate to any other liability insurance, whether
primary or excess, covering the car or the driver. Therefore, to
give other insurance clauses effect in the sense most congruous
8. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1951.
9. Id. art. 1953.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
to the matter of the contract, it seems clear that the term "other
valid and collectible insurance" must be applied to the circum-
stances of the particular case, not any conceivable circumstances.
The court's holding that another provision of the garage
policy had the effect of reducing the coverage afforded by it to
the minimum required by the Louisiana financial responsibility
law seems correct.
Facts on all fours with those in Graves were again presented
to the First Circuit, although to a different panel, in Cotton v.
Associated Indem. Corp. of San Francisco,10 and the court fol-
lowed the opinion rendered in Graves. The garage insurer under-
took to introduce evidence at the appellate level through the
testimony of a claimed expert concerning the purpose of such
provisions and the underlying reasons therefor. The court re-
fused to consider the testimony and added, "We do not believe
the motives behind such clauses in insurance policies nor the
basis for calculating the premium can be given sufficient weight
to justify our holding contra to the well reasoned decision of the
Third Circuit in the Lincombe case and the State Farm case."
Pretermitting consideration of the procedural issue, it is believed
that policy provisions "must be examined and interpreted in the
light of their design and intent," as the Supreme Court once
observed.1
A decision which might have gone the other way was ren-
dered in Harvey v. General Guar. Ins. Co.12 Insured, having a
$3,000 policy providing protection against loss by fire of his
home payable to a first mortgagee as his interest might appear,
procured a second policy in another company for $5,000 payable
to a second mortgagee as his interest might appear. When a
total loss occurred the second insurer insisted that its liability
was controlled by a pro rata clause which made it not liable
for a greater proportion of any loss than the insured amount
bore to the whole insurance covering the property against the
peril involved. The court, relying on authority from other juris-
dictions, held that the valued policy law of the state required
payment of the face amount of the policy. The valued policy
law requires payment of "the total amount for which the prop-
erty is insured at the time of such total destruction in the policy
of such insurer."1' Therefore, the ultimate question was whether
10. 200 So.2d 78 (La. App. lst Cir. 1967).
11. Pullen v. Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp., 230 La. 867, 89 So.2d 373
(1956).
12. 201 So.2d 689 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
13. LA. R.S. 22:695 (1950).
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the total amount in the policy of such insurer was $5,000 or be-
cause of the pro rata clause and the existence of other insur-
ance in the amount of $3,000 was 5/8ths of $5,000. The ques-
tion is a delicate one. However, it is questionable whether the
holding in the instant case was required by the valued policy
law. Under our jurisprudence this law does not preclude the
use of a co-insurance clause although such a clause, in effect,
permits the insurer to go into the question of the actual cash
value of the property as compared with the face amount of the
policy. The purpose, however, is not to determine the amount
of the loss but the amount of the insurance. This being true, it
would seem to follow that a pro rata clause which merely fixes
the amount for which the property is insured does not conflict
with the valued policy law. Finally, both the valued policy law
and the pro rata clause have legislative sanction 14 and should be
reconciled if possible.
The holding in Fouquier v. Travelers Ins. Co.,15 that an in-
sured injured by the joint negligence of an insured and an
uninsured motorist is not entitled to a judgment in solido against
his own insurer under the uninsured motorist clause, seems
open to question. In support of this position it was said that if
payment were made by the plaintiff's insurer under the unin-
sured motorist provision it would be subrogated to the right of
its insured against the joint tortfeasors but that, if solidarily
liable with them, it would have no such right. It appears, how-
ever, that subrogation does apply in the case of co-debtors in
solido to the extent of the portion of the debt due by each.' 6 And
beyond this, the responsibility of the uninsured motorist insurer
would actually be in solidum rather than in solido, an imperfect
solidarity or solidary responsibility rather than solidary lia-
bility, and subrogation would take place to the extent of the
payment. 17 In addition, the mere fact that judgment may be ob-
tained in solido against two or more debtors does not preclude
recovery in full by one liable only technically and not guilty of
negligence against the one whose negligence causes the injury.18
14. Id. 22:691, 22:695.
15. 204 So.2d 400 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
16. Theus v. Armistead, 116 La. 795, 41 So. 95 (1906) ; Cotton v. Stirling,
19 La. Ann. 137 (1867).
17. Gay v. Blanchard, 32 La. Ann. 497 (1880). See also The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1966-1967 Term-Insurance, 28 LA. L. REv.
372 (1968).
18. Appalachian Corp. v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 151 La. 41, 91 So. 539
(1922) ; American Employers' Ins. Co. v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 4 So.2d 628
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1941).
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Since the policy of the plaintiff insurer bound it "to pay all
sums which the insured . . . shall be legally entitled to recover
as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured auto-
mobile" it owed a responsibility to its insured, although con-
tractual in nature, which was in addition to the solidary re-
sponsibility of the joint tortfeasors. The court seemed to recog-
nize a weakness in its position when it reserved the right of
plaintiff against his insurer in the event the insurer of the in-
sured tortfeasor might be unable to satisfy the judgment against
it. It might have been better to have included the plaintiff's
insurer in the judgment leaving to it the opportunity to claim
indemnity against the joint tortfeasors if compelled to pay.
The holding of the court in Temple v. Harper,19 that an im-
perfect solidarity exists between a tortfeasor and the plain-
tiff's collision insurer to the extent of the liability of the in-
surer, seems entirely correct. This, again, is the liability in
solidum of the Romans rather than liability in solido which
stems from agreement or a positive provision of the law. Never-
theless, it supports a judgment against each debtor to the full
extent of his responsibility.
20
The plaintiff in Shaw v. New York Fire & Marine Under-
writers, Inc.21 was ifijured when the car in which he was riding
as a guest was in collision with another. The drivers of both
cars were found contributorily negligent. Suit, however, had
been brought against only the insurers of both drivers. Plain-
tiff's damages were fixed at $15,000 and judgment was ren-
dered against one insurer, New York, for the limit of its lia-
bility, $5,000, and the other, Liberty Mutual, for the limit of its
liability, $10,000. The court of appeal affirmed the judgment of
the trial court and in doing so rejected the claim of New York
that it was entitled to contribution from Liberty Mutual in the
amount of fifty percent of the judgment against it. The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari limited to the question of con-
tribution. Its opinion reflects that Liberty Mutual contended for
its part that the insurers should have been cast in solido in the
amount of $5,000, and that judgment for an additional $5,000
should have been rendered against it to exhaust its liability.
The Supreme Court felt that the claims of the insurers would
operate to the prejudice of plaintiff and, therefore, rejected
19. 200 So.2d 749 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
20. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2082; The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts
for the 1966-1967 Term-Insurance, 28 LA. L. REV. 372 (1968).
21. 212 So.2d 419 (La. 1968). See also DeLatin v. New York Fire & Marine
Underwriters, Inc., 204 So.2d 690 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
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them, saying that Article 2103 of the Civil Code could not be
applied to the prejudice of the creditor. This seems to be cer-
tainly correct. Actually, it appears that through their insurers
one of the solidary debtors had paid one-third of the debt and
the other two-thirds. The latter insurer should have a claim to
contribution from the insured whose responsibility, in effect,
had been fixed at $7,500 but who had coverage in the amount
of only $5,000.
In an exhaustive and well-documented opinion in Webb v.
Zurich Ins. Co.,22 the Supreme Court held applicable the Louisi-
ana direct action provision with respect to an accident that oc-
curred outside the state inasmuch as the policy was secured in
this state, from an agent of an insurer doing business in this
state, and by an insured domiciled in this state. The decision
effectuates Louisiana's public policy as reflected in the history
of the direct action statute, the details of which are given in the
opinion. This case and the companion Owen case 23 were held con-
trolling in Michel v. Bahn, 2 4 where the accident occurred in Mis-
sissippi but the individual defendant was a resident of Louisiana.
In a case of first impression it was held in Lawrence v. Con-
tinental Ins. Co.2 that a liability insurer could not enforce as
against its insured, claiming on the basis of uninsured motorist
coverage, a policy provision recognizing a right in the insurer
to require joinder of the uninsured motorist, where personal
service could not be had against the latter in this state. Section
629 of the Insurance Code was found controlling.
A reservation of a power to change the beneficiary of a life
insurance policy is effective. Our Supreme Court has adopted
the view, however, that the rights of the parties become fixed
at the insured's death. Where he dies before a change of bene-
ficiary has been completed in accordance with the terms of the
policy the company may not waive the policy requirement and
the attempted change is ineffective.26 In American Nat. Ins. Co.
v. Ramon2 7 the policy provided that a change of beneficiary
could be effected by filing written request at the home office
and that when recorded at the home office the change would
take effect as of the date the request was signed "whether or
22. 251 La. 558, 205 So.2d 398 (1967).
23. Owen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 251 La. 590, 205 So.2d 411 (1967).
24. 207 So.2d 150 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
25. 199 So.2d 398 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
26. Giuffria v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 188 La. 837, 178 So. 368 (1937).
27. 208 So.2d 392 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
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not the insured is living when the change is recorded." The
court distinguished the Giuffria case 28 on the basis of the policy
language and held effective a change of beneficiary request
received at the home office prior to the death of the insured
but recorded a day thereafter. Since the recordation was a purely
ministerial act and the wish of the insured had been clearly and
formally expressed, the holding seems not in conflict with the
established rule.
In an opinion which contains a scholarly weighing of the
jurisprudence covering the application of R.S. 22:619B, the
First Circuit held that a finding of an intent to deceive is neces-
sary to support the insurer's defense based on an alleged ma-
terial misrepresentation in an application for a policy of life
insurance.2 9
The Supreme Court will resolve the issue that has divided
some lower appellate courts concerning the nature of an action
by an insured against his uninsured motorist insurer and the
applicable prescriptive period. Writs of certiorari have been
granted in Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.° and Thomas v.
Employers Mut. Fire Ins. Co.31 Certiorari has likewise been
granted in Verneco, Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York,32
which deals with the application of a fidelity bond provision
excluding coverage under stated circumstances, and Mullin v.
Skains,3 which held that a release given by an insured to his un-
insured motorist insurer did not prejudice the joint tortfeasors.
PUBLIC LAW
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Michael R. Klein*
The occurrence of elections during the symposium period re-
sulted in a number of noteworthy decisions clarifying the elec-
tion laws. Lasseigne v. Martin' presented the First Circuit with
28. Giuffria v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 188 La. 837, 178 So. 368 (1937).
29. Knight v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 205 So.2d 485 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1967). For earlier discussions of the problem see The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1956-1957 Term-Insurance, 18 LA. L. REv. 73 (1957). The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Circuits for the 1963-1964 Term-Insurance,
25 LA. L. REv. 386 (1965).
30. 207 So.2d 925 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
31. 208 So.2d 374 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
32. 207 So.2d 828 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
33. 205 So.2d 207 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967).
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 202 So.2d 250 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
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